Bank Holding Companies’ Accounting Versus Economic Hedging Activities in the SFAS 133 Framework by Drakopoulou, Veliota
Business Administration - Worldwide College of Business 
2015 
Bank Holding Companies’ Accounting Versus Economic Hedging 
Activities in the SFAS 133 Framework 
Veliota Drakopoulou 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, drakopov@erau.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ww-business-admininstration 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Drakopoulou, V. (2015). Bank Holding Companies’ Accounting Versus Economic Hedging Activities in the 
SFAS 133 Framework. Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance, 3(2). https://doi.org/10.13189/
ujaf.2015.030202 
All articles published by HRPUB will be distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License(CC-BY). So anyone is allowed to copy, distribute, and transmit the article on condition that the 
original article and source is correctly cited. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration - Worldwide by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance 3(2): 30-44, 2015 http://www.hrpub.org 
DOI: 10.13189/ujaf.2015.030202 
Bank Holding Companies’ Accounting Versus Economic 
Hedging Activities in the SFAS 133 Framework 
Veliota Drakopoulou 
Forbes School of Business, Ashford University , United States 
  
Copyright © 2015 Horizon Research Publishing All rights reserved. 
Abstract  The goal of this research was to investigate the 
controversy surrounding the inability of Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 133), 
Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities to portray the economics of hedging. This research 
examined whether or not the possibility of increased 
volatility evolved from economic hedges that do not qualify 
for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 prompted Bank 
Holding Companies (BHCs) to adjust their corporate risk 
management strategy to one that is more accounting 
responsive. Based on the results of this research, BHCs’ 
which increased the level of accounting hedges and 
decreased the level of economic hedges experienced a 
significant decrease in earnings volatility relative to 
pre-SFAS 133. The findings suggest that BHCs’ ability to 
reduce earnings volatility and increase earnings smoothing to 
meet analysts’ expectations after the 2008 amendment of 
SFAS 133 has an adverse impact on BHCs’ continual use of 
economic hedges. Analysts and investors are recommended 
to evaluate further BHCs’ risk strategies to gain a better 
representation of their risk paradigm with derivatives. This 
study extends prior research on corporate risk management 
activities of BHCs and contributes to social change by 
presenting new affirmation to investors of the influence of 
SFAS 133 economic hedges on earnings volatility. 
Keywords  Derivatives, Accounting for Derivatives and 
Hedging Activities, Economic Hedges, Fair Value Hedges, 
Cash Flow Hedges, SFAS 133, Corporate Risk Management, 
Earnings Volatility, Earnings Smoothing 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2008, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), in response to the explosive derivative activities 
growth fueled by the financial market innovations and the 
need to actively manage financial risk exposures inherent in 
the operations of large financial institutions, amended 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 133 (SFAS 
133), Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities with the intention to regulate the accounting for 
corporate hedging strategies with derivatives and minimize 
the information asymmetry recognized in the standard before 
amended. The amended standard is effective for financial 
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) after September of 2008 [4, para.1]. 
The controversy surrounding SFAS 133 has centered on 
its incapacity to represent hedging economic risks and risk 
management activities. The biggest challenge companies 
face when reporting derivatives on the balance sheet is how 
to handle the gains and losses originating from changes in 
derivatives’ fair value, since fair value fluctuates 
periodically [10, 2003]. Hedge accounting reduces earnings 
volatility by minimizing the potential income statement 
effect of the risk that is being hedged, since it causes the 
derivative gains or losses to influence revenues in the period 
corresponding to the gain or loss consequential to the risk 
being hedged.  
The alternative to hedge accounting that is applied to 
economic hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting is 
to recognize fluctuations in the recorded fair value of 
derivative hedging instruments immediately in earnings, 
causing redundant volatility in earnings. Proponents of the 
standard presumed that the hedging activities addressed in 
SFAS 133 mitigated the economic risks hedged with 
derivatives. This view is supported by Guay[20] and 
Melumad, Weyns, and Ziv[29] who illustrated that the 
accounting method used influenced the manager’s hedging 
decision under a certain definition of fair-value hedge 
accounting preserving the ultimate economic hedge. 
On the contrary, Barnes [5] supported that the hedge 
accounting regulations conforming to SFAS 133 led to 
misrepresentation of economic hedges. Peterson and 
Thiagarajon[34] disputed that the different accounting 
treatment of economically identical transactions (economic 
hedges vs. SFAS 133 accounting hedges) forced companies 
to base their hedging decisions on the accounting treatment 
the hedges received. In the same spirit, Lins, Servaes, and 
Tamayo[28] studied the results of SFAS 133 on firms’ 
corporate risk management activities and found that 40% of 
the surveyed firms had to alter their hedging strategies since 
they felt their ability to use economic hedges had been 
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compromised. Kolbasovsky[27] identified firms that 
recently restated their financial statements as a result of the 
misclassification of economic hedges as accounting hedges 
and found that only 58% of these firms continued the use of 
economic hedges disregarding the increased earnings 
volatility resultant of the accelerated earnings recognition of 
the economic hedges. 
Given that the purpose of hedging is to shield the financial 
statements from the effect of conflicting fluctuations in 
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or credit rates 
according to Coughlan[10], it is alleged in the financial 
markets that companies exercising derivatives for hedging 
would reassess their risk management approach to one that is 
more accounting responsive to ensure that all hedges are 
highly effective to qualify for hedge accounting. Consistent 
with this view, DeMarzo and Duffie [12] confirmed that the 
ideal hedging strategy implemented by executives is 
determined by the accounting information presented to 
stockholders, clarifying firms’ given emphasis on hedging 
accounting risks rather than economic risks. 
This study extended the corporate risk management 
behavior of BHCs in the framework of SFAS 133 as 
amended in 2008. Although accounting for derivative 
instruments and hedging activities has been one of the most 
debated issues among academics and practitioners, no prior 
research provided evidence of how the corporate risk 
management behavior of BHCs depended upon the 
accounting and the underlying economics of hedging. The 
new paradigm for corporate risk management discussed 
reflects BHCs’ undertaking to detain the economic benefits 
of hedging associated with Statement 133’s differential 
treatment of the gains and losses of accounting vs. economic 
hedges. This research improved upon previous research by 
investigating BHCs’ hedging activities to find possible 
differences in earnings volatility related to the timing of the 
amount of gains and losses recognized in income on 
derivative hedging instruments for accounting vs. economic 
hedges [14, para.17-35]. Prior accounting literature on SFAS 
133 failed to measure the influence of economic hedges on 
earnings volatility and focused only on firms’ incentives to 
reduce reported earnings volatility by measuring whether or 
not firms moderated the use of derivatives after the adoption 
of SFAS 133 and increased earnings smoothing through 
discretionary accruals (see Park[33]; Singh[39]; Zhang[44]; 
Zhou[46]. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Hypothesis Development of BHCs Corporate Risk 
Management Philosophy in the SFAS 133 
Framework 
The FASB, in the original pronouncements as amended 
for accounting for derivative instruments and hedging 
activities required that: 
An entity should recognize all of its derivative 
instruments on the balance sheet as either assets or 
liabilities at fair value. The accounting for gains or 
losses resulted from changes in the fair value of a 
derivative depends on whether it has been designated 
and qualifies as part of a hedging relationship and, if so, 
on the reason for holding it. For a derivative designated 
as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a 
recognized asset or liability, the gain or loss is 
recognized in earnings in the period of change together 
with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item 
attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that 
accounting is to reflect in earnings the extent to which 
the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting 
changes in fair value. For a derivative not designated as 
a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in 
earnings in the period of change. [14, para.17-18, p.15] 
In the banking industry, according to Park[33] there is an 
intense debate about whether or not recognizing the 
fluctuations in fair value of derivative hedging instruments 
that do not comply for hedge accounting immediately in 
earnings under SFAS 133 would increase reported earnings 
volatility, subsidizing both banks’ competence to administer 
risk efficiently and sustain customers’ demand for 
derivatives. Khan[26] prognosticated that under fair value 
accounting banks with bigger quotas of derivative assets and 
liabilities would be influenced more since they countenance 
the burden to discount their derivate assets prices in a bearing 
stock market to either prevent sale by others or breach capital 
adequacy ratios. 
Banks’ corporate risk valuation is significant, according to 
Clark, Desisle, and Doran[7], because of banks’ important 
role as financial intermediaries. Clark et al.[7] concluded that 
banks’ excessive exposure to foreign exchange, interest rates, 
and other risks not only causes banks and their customers’ 
potential suffering, but causes capital markets to lose 
additional access to financing through decreased market 
liquidity. 
Park[33] argued that SFAS 133 affected both banks’ sales 
and corporate risk management policies for derivatives and 
hedging activities since banks participating in the derivatives 
markets function as both dealers and end users of derivatives. 
BHCs revenues from sales of derivatives would decrease if 
the demand for banks’ derivative products decreased. BHCs’ 
hedging policies could result in the implementation of fewer 
effective hedges if the perceived notion that the use of 
derivatives that do not comply for hedging designation might 
increase earnings volatility. Therefore, SFAS 133 would lead 
to banks’ negative stock price reactions if investors conceive 
that the implementation of SFAS 133 might affect negatively 
banks’ derivative sales and their ability to hedge using 
derivative instruments.  
The problem stemming from the initiation of SFAS 133 is 
that the possibility of increased volatility evolved from 
economic hedges that do not comply for hedge accounting 
might have prompted some BHCs to adjust their corporate 
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risk management strategies to be more accounting 
responsive to smooth earnings in order to avoid analysts’ 
negative stock valuations. BHCs along with the reassessment 
of their corporate risk management strategy, must also 
address the implementation of 2008 SFAS 133, since the 
standard “placed the burden on management to design an 
appropriate effectiveness test, and measure the change in fair 
value or cash flows attributable to the risk being hedged” 
[14,p.129], thus advocating an opportunistic earnings 
management behavior. 
The Board recognized that SFAS 133, although clarified 
and accommodated “hedge accounting for more types of 
derivatives and different views or risks” [14,para.242,p.108] 
acclaimed that the standard did not provide a distinctive  
approach for evaluating hedge effectiveness, imposing the 
responsibility to the management to originate the appropriate 
hedge-effectiveness tests while taking into consideration the 
risk management tactics of the corporation, the nature of the 
hedged risk, and the type of derivatives used as hedging 
instrument [14,para.361]. 
BHCs’ design of effectiveness tests are determined by the 
concern of the additional earnings volatility, possibly 
evolved from economically effective hedges that do not 
qualify for hedge accounting. The possibility of additional 
volatility in the income statement has caused banks’ 
apprehension of negative stock valuations, as supported by 
the theoretical findings of Suh[40], Thapa and Brown[41], 
Wang[43], and Park[33]. Specifically, Thapa and Brown[41] 
and Park[33] construed that negative stock price reaction to 
earnings announcements encourage the negative financial 
fallout of SFAS 133 and are indicative of investors’ views 
that Standard 133 introduces volatility to reported earnings. 
Suh[40] predicted that firms with a more transient investor 
base would decrease their hedging activities to a greater 
extent post SFAS 133 than firms with a more long-term 
investor base because transient investors are more concerned 
with the potential increase in short-term earnings volatility 
resulting from derivatives that do not comply for hedge 
accounting. In order to gain investors’ appreciation through a 
higher price-earnings ratio for implementing an efficient 
corporate risk management strategy, companies should be 
able to inform their stockholders for their hedging strategies, 
according to McCormack[30], a Morgan Stanley equity 
researcher, who argued that SFAS 133 reduced the 
effectiveness of economic risk management practices of 
companies by making it impractical to hedge real economic 
risk exposures devoid of earning volatility.  
Contributing to the corporate risk management literature, 
Suh[40] argued that the hedging disclosures of SFAS 133 did 
not provide a clear picture of whether companies’ earnings 
volatility intensifications originated from speculative hedges 
or from economic hedges. Allayannis, Rountree, and 
Weston[1] documented that financial statement volatility is 
costly and directly affects a firm’s value. In the same spirit, 
Trombey[42] attested that most financial institutions attempt 
to decrease earning volatility with hedging since negative 
earnings surprises signal an incompetent corporate risk 
management and are viewed negatively by investors and 
analysts. Wang[43] documented that, although bad and good 
earnings news (as measured by the square of standardized 
unexpected earnings [SUE] increased future return volatility, 
bad earnings news raised future volatility more than good 
earnings news did. 
The expectation of added volatility in financial statements 
has instigated significant concern for many BHCs, as they 
fear it would vanguard lower firm valuations. Corman[9] 
stated that Fitch Ratings, in a 2004 study, found enormous 
inconsistencies in the corporate implementations of SFAS 
133, which produced significant uncertainty for investors 
and rating agencies, while the restatements related to the 
implementation of hedge accounting for certain derivative 
transactions under SFAS 133 ascended greatly since 2003, 
from  514 to about 1,200 in 2005. 
Bank of America in 2006 restated its historical financial 
statements for the years 2001-2005 related to the accounting 
designation for certain derivative instruments under SFAS 
133 because “a number of the transactions included in the 
restatement did not meet the strict requirements of the 
shortcut method of accounting under SFAS 133” [2, Note 
1:Summary of Significant Accounting Principles,p.93]. 
Additionally, Davis[48] reported that SunTrust Banks Inc. 
adjusted their 2006 fourth quarter earnings to correct 
accounting errors related to certain derivatives transactions 
from 2003 to 2005, and two Alabama banking 
companies—Compass Bancshares Inc., and Colonial 
BancGroup Inc.—also restated earnings in 2006 because of 
SFAS 133. 
2.1. Mortgage Banking Risk Management and 
Accounting for Economic Hedges 
SFAS 133 as the primary directive for the accounting 
treatment of derivative instruments in the United States 
requires all entities to disclose information about the interest 
rate, foreign exchange rate, and credit risk exposures hedged 
with derivative instruments. Statement 133 constrains 
financial institutions to distinguish between derivative 
instruments designated as hedges used for corporate risk 
management purposes such as fair value hedges and cash 
flow hedges and derivative instruments used to hedge 
economic risks such as economic hedges [14, para.44]. 
Derivatives instruments used by BHCs and designated as 
economic hedges do not comply for hedge accounting under 
SFAS 133 and should be included in derivative assets or 
derivative liabilities.  
Bank of America in its 2008 10-K stated that: Economic 
hedges used in mortgage banking to decrease the sensitivity 
of earnings to interest rate and market value fluctuations 
include: interest rate swaps that do not qualify for the 
shortcut method (used to open or close gaps identified by the 
Asset-Liability management (ALM) of banks), mortgage 
servicing rights (MSRs), interest rate lock commitments 
(IRLCs), first mortgage loans held-for- sale (LHFS), and 
credit derivatives. Changes in the fair value of derivatives 
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that serve as asset and liability management (ALM) 
economic hedges, which do not qualify or were not 
designated as accounting hedges, should be recorded in other 
income (loss). Changes in the fair value of derivatives that 
serve as economic hedges of mortgage servicing rights 
(MSRs), interest rate lock commitments (IRLCs) and first 
mortgage loans held-for-sale (LHFS) should be recorded in 
mortgage banking income. Credit derivatives used by a bank 
do not qualify for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 despite 
being effective economic hedges and changes in the fair 
value of these derivatives should be included in other income 
(loss). [2, 10K, p.112] 
2.1.1. ALM Economic Hedges 
BHCs’ utilize interest rate derivatives in their ALM 
portfolio to decrease earnings volatility resulting from 
adverse interest rate movements as part of their corporate 
risk management strategy to protect profitability and capital 
adequacy ratios. The gains and losses derived from BHCs 
interest rate derivative instruments are likely to offset  
increases or decreases of the net interest margin of 
variable-rate hedged assets and liabilities due to changes in 
market interest rates. Interest rate swap derivatives are 
utilized in BHCs ALM portfolio to manage exposures from 
fluctuations in interest rates. Interest rate swaps are used to 
hedge fixed- interest rates against floating- interest rates by 
providing an agreement between two parties to exchange a 
fixed payment for a floating payment linked to the LIBOR. 
Interest rate swaps that transfer fixed interest rate debt to 
floating interest debt are fair value hedges and swaps that 
transfer floating interest rate debt to fixed interest rate debt 
are cash flow hedges [14, para.68-70]. Interest rate swaps are 
designated to hedge the gains and losses on the hedged item 
due to changes in benchmark interest rates such as the U.S. 
Treasury rates or the LIBOR. The benchmark interest rate 
concept was first presented in SFAS 138 as a substitute for 
the risk-free rate concept that the FASB originally used in 
Statement 133 [14, para.540]. The shortcut method can be 
used for both swap fair value hedges and cash flow hedges if 
the hedging relationship meets certain conditions 
simplifying swap accounting. Under the shortcut method of 
accounting if the fair value of an interest rate swap is zero at 
the inception of the hedging relationship then no- hedge 
ineffectiveness is assumed and the changes of the hedged 
item value offset the estimated changes in value of the swap 
in every period [14, para.114]. However, if the fair value of 
an interest rate swap is not zero at the inception of the 
hedging relationship then the interest rate swap does not 
comply for the shortcut method and it is considered an 
economic hedge instead [14, para.68(b)]. 
2.1.2. IRLCs and LHFS Economic Hedges 
Interest rate lock commitments (IRLCs) are derivative 
loans that expire usually 60 days after the commitment day 
between a loan borrower and a lender mortgage bank under 
which the lender agrees to finance a residential loan on a 
fixed-rate, adjustable-rate or floating- rate basis, without 
taking into consideration market interest changes according 
to FDIC[16]. Under SFAS No. 149, “Amendment of 
Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities,” derivative loan commitments associated with the 
commencing of mortgage loans held- for- sale (LHFS) are 
assumed to be derivatives and are reported on the balance 
sheet at fair value while their gains and losses are recognized 
in mortgage banking income [14, para.6(c) & 10(i)]. 
Outstanding IRLCs expose BHCs to the risk that the 
underlying rate of the LHFS might decrease during the 
commitment period affecting the value of the loan. BHCs 
economically hedge the risk of prospective changes in the 
value of the loan by hedging the underlying rate of the 
mortgage loan with forward loan sales commitments, interest 
rate swaps and options. Bank of America[2]; Ryan[38]. 
2.1.3. MSR Economic Hedges 
FASB Statement 122 Accounting for Mortgage Servicing 
Rights [15] defines mortgage servicing rights (MSRs) as the 
rights of a mortgage lender to service an existing mortgage 
through either the purchase or origination of the mortgage 
loan. MSRs are accounted for at fair value and the gains and 
losses due to changes in the fair value of those MSRs are 
recorded in mortgage banking income. Interest rate options 
and swaps, forward settlement contracts, and euro-dollar 
futures are used as economic hedges of MSRs to decrease the 
sensitivity of earnings due to market interest rate variations 
[2]. According to Hutchison[24] hedging the MSR derivative 
portfolio is economically speculative and potentially 
generates considerable cash flow volatility. At the same time 
MSR accounting causes sizable earnings volatility 
independent of the cash flow volatility determined by the 
valuation effects of interest rate shocks on MSRs and the 
accounting asymmetry of MSR-origination loans. The author 
proposed that banks may be forced to uneconomically hedge 
their mortgage banking loans positions if they the perceived 
accounting asymmetry on cumulative earnings persists for 
long periods.  
2.1.4. Credit Derivatives 
Banks enter credit derivatives mainly to economically 
hedge their credit exposures associated with loans and also to 
provide credit derivatives to clients who want to intensify or 
reduce credit-default exposures. Bedendoa and Brunella[6] 
presuming on the main hypothetical incentives for credit risk 
transfer (CRT) found that undercapitalized banks with high 
credit-risk loan portfolio management, cash-flow shortages, 
and asymmetric information constraints tend to utilize 
customary CRT provisions such as guaranteed loans and 
syndicated & securitized financing, while large banks with 
satisfying capital adequacy ratios responded to adverse 
financial shocks by increasing the use of credit derivatives. 
Based on Bank of Americas[2] financial statements, credit 
derivatives are contractual agreements that allow BHCs to 
generate or to lessen credit exposure linked to defaulting 
mortgage loans, foreclosing, liquidation or interest rate and 
foreign-exchange rate fluctuations. A BHC as the credit 
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protection buyer mitigates customers’ default- risk by 
entering into a credit protection agreement with a protection 
buyer. A BHC as the protection buyer pays the protection 
seller a recurring charge during the term of the credit 
derivative expecting to get compensated from the protection 
seller in case a customer defaults payments on a loan. Jun[47] 
detailed that model risk (derived from the complex models of 
credit derivatives, settlement risk (derived from the 
settlement of credit derivatives following a default), and 
counterparty credit risk was some of the imposed challenges 
faced by commercial banks in their attempt to administer the 
risk of their loan portfolio using credit derivatives. 
3. Hypothesis Development of BHCs 
Corporate Risk Management 
Philosophy in the SFAS 133 
Framework 
In the existing accounting literature, there is a belief that 
some BHCs might have been prompted to adjust their 
corporate risk management strategy to one that is more 
accounting responsive to avoid increased earnings volatility 
with hedge accounting. SFAS 133 has compromised BHCs’ 
capacity to economically hedge financial risks since they are 
forced to decide between using economic hedges that 
increase earnings volatility but efficiently handle economic 
risks or decrease earnings volatility using corporate risk 
management approaches that are economically ineffective or 
not practical. These concerns have been supported by the 
theoretical findings of Kolsasovsky[27], Lins, Servaes, and 
Tamayo[28], Revsine, Collins, and Johnson[37], Peterson 
and Thiagarajon[34], and DeMarzo et al.[12]. 
Characteristically, Lins et al.[28] stated that:  
Firms that operate in an environment where contracts are 
more likely to be written on accounting data, and firms that 
attach more importance to the reduction of earnings volatility 
as a benefit of risk management are more affected and care 
more about obtaining hedge accounting. (p. 34) 
Additionally, Green (2008) stated that Statement 133 does 
not permit special hedge accounting for all relationships that 
may be economic hedges. A BHC, in order to designate a 
hedging relationship for SFAS 133 hedge accounting 
purposes, must identify the hedged asset, liability, or 
transaction, but that designation might not necessarily 
correspond exactly with management’s overall economic 
goals. The author concluded that BHCs would be reluctant to 
use economic hedges if the accounting income is going to be 
affected adversely, not by economic events, but by the 
accounting convention applied to hedges (not allowing 
hedge accounting). 
The Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the 
American Accounting Association, in a comment letter 
(1999) to the Joint Working Group of Standard Setters 
(JWG), defended the idea that SFAS 133, by not allowing a 
hedge designation for economic hedges, causes financial 
statements to suffer from material economic earnings 
volatility due to the lack of a fair value measurement of 
hedged items. This view was supported by the theoretical 
findings of Lins et al.[28], who documented a considerable 
diminution in derivative instruments with a negative 
likelihood to comply for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 
such as foreign exchange derivatives and nonlinear 
derivatives such as vanilla options and exotic derivatives. 
According to the extant accounting literature, economic 
hedges used “ in mortgage banking to reduce the sensitivity 
of earnings to interest rate and market value fluctuations” [2, 
p.112] cause increased volatility in earnings since they do 
not qualify for hedge accounting. Specifically, the 
accounting treatment of MSRs creates a serious earnings 
timing difference between the recognition of servicing rights 
losses and the income from mortgage origination that 
exposes even an economically (cash flow) hedged mortgage 
bank to serious earnings volatility. Hutchison[24] suggested 
that many economically hedge mortgage banks will have 
incentives to take uneconomic hedge positions against their 
servicing rights portfolios because that short-term earnings 
volatility induced by the asymmetric accounting treatment of 
the servicing and origination franchises is marked and 
persistent. 
Additionally, if the fair value of an interest rate swap is not 
zero it does not qualify for the shortcut method. In this case, 
the change in the value of hedged item and the swap are 
calculated separately, and the difference between the two is 
charged to income creating earnings volatility, which can be 
significant if the swap is not well matched to the hedged item 
[14, para.114]. 
According to the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency [32] because no hedging forward loan sales 
commitments are assessed at fair value all through earnings 
when the fair value of the mortgage loans increase above 
their cost basis would cause increased volatility in reported 
earnings. The reported earnings volatility is resulting from 
realizing in income the amount of loss from changes in the 
fair value of the forward loan sales commitments without 
modifying the book value over the costs basis of the 
mortgage loans. 
Therefore, to determine whether the possibility of 
increased volatility evolved from economic hedges that do 
not comply for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 prompted 
some BHCs to adjust their corporate risk management 
strategy to one that is more accounting responsive, the 
following research question was proposed: 
Did BHCs hedge in the optimal economic way (thus 
recognizing the volatility in earnings originated from 
those hedges that did not comply for hedge accounting 
treatment), or did BHCs hedge in a limited fashion only 
where hedge accounting treatment could be attained 
(thus evading additional earnings volatility and 
decreasing just a limited amount of the economic 
risks)? 
H10: There was no difference in the mean notional value 
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of derivatives for SFAS133-compliant hedgers and 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers after the 2008 amendment of 
SFAS 133. 
H1a: There was a difference in the mean notional value of 
derivatives for SFAS133-compliant hedgers and 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers after the 2008 amendment of 
SFAS 133. 
4. Research Design and Empirical 
Models 
4.1. Measurement of Derivatives 
“The FASB decided to define derivative instruments based 
characteristics rather than simply referring to financial 
instruments commonly known to be derivatives.’ 
Trombley[42, p.26]. The FASB wanted to make sure that as 
new derivatives are invented, Statement 133 would continue 
to apply to them as long as their characteristics are similar to 
those of currently available derivatives. Trombley[42]. 
Financial instruments have three characteristics according to 
the FASB’s definition of derivatives, included in the scope 
the definition of SFAS 133 [14, para.6]. First, “derivatives 
should have one or more underlying prices or values and one 
or more notional amounts and/or contract payment 
provisions” (p. 8). Second, derivative contracts should 
require a zero invested capital to initiate or an invested 
capital that is lesser than comparable investment contracts 
with analogous expected responses to financial market 
changes. Third, derivatives should necessitate a cash 
payment settlement between the contract parties or 
settlement by delivery of an asset that can be easily 
converted into cash or is another derivative. 
In the extant literature, the notional principal amounts of 
the overall derivatives positions (swaps, forwards, futures 
and options based on interest rates, exchange rates, and other 
underlying instruments) is used to measure derivatives as a 
proxy for hedging according to Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad[4]; Gilkeson and Smith[17]; Hirtle[21]; Park[33]; 
Purnanandam[36]; Zhao and Moser[45]. The total notional 
amount of derivative instruments designated as economic 
hedges of MSRs, IRLCs, LHFSs, ALMs, and credit 
derivatives and the total notional amount of the derivatives 
instruments and other securities designated as fair value 
hedges and cash flow hedges were used as a measure of 
derivatives. 
4.2. Model for Testing BHC’s Corporate Risk 
Management Behavior  
This research investigated the Corporate Risk 
Management Behavior of BHCs by testing whether or not 
BHCs exhibited a more accounting responsive risk 
management approach and hedged in a limited fashion only 
where hedge accounting treatment could be attained after the 
2008 amendment of SFAS 133. Descriptive statistics were 
used to measure if there is a significant difference on the use 
of derivative instruments designated as accounting hedges 
and economic hedges by BHCs in 2008 (the year SFAS 133 
was amended) and in 2009 (one year after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS 133). Descriptive statistics provided 
information about (1) the total notional value of cash flow 
hedges, fair value hedges, and economic hedges of 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers and SFAS133-compliant 
hedgers, (2) the dependent and independent variables of both 
groups, and (3) the effects of derivative instruments on the 
income statement for both groups. 
More specifically, t-tests were conducted to compare 
possible differences in the mean notional value of derivatives 
designated as cash flow hedges, fair value hedges, and 
economic hedges of the two groups of BHCs as reported in 
their 2008 and 2009 financial statements. Furthermore, to 
test research question one, Singh’s[39] multivariate 
regression model was referenced. Using Singh’s[39] 
modified regression model, the mean notional value of 
derivative instruments for SFAS133-accounting hedgers and 
SFAS133- compliant hedgers is regressed on their 
motivation to decrease earnings volatility and on regression 
control variables that proxy for the hedging incentives of 
these two groups of BHCs. These control variables proxied 
for financial distress, managerial risk aversion, 
underinvestment costs, information asymmetry, and the 
regulatory capital adequacy of BHCs based on prior 
literature on theoretical corporate risk management. A 
definition of the variables utilized in this research is 
presented in Appendix A. 
Additionally, two dummy variables were incorporated in 
the regression equation to proxy for the period after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS 133 (After) and to designate BHCs as 
accounting or compliant hedgers (HAT). The use of the two 
dummy variables helped evaluate the coefficient 
differentiations of the independent variables after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS 133 relative to the coefficients before 
the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133 for both BHCs groups. 
After is a dummy variable coded as 1 for the post-2008 
amendment of SFAS 133 and coded as 0 otherwise. HAT is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 when BHCs use both economic 
and accounting hedges and coded as 0 otherwise. 
Particularly, the multivariate regression took the following 
form: 
Notionalit = β0 + β1EVolit +β2ESmoothit +β3ESmooth1it 
+β4FINLEVit + β5CapAdeq1it +β6UNDERCit + 
β7INFOASYit + β8MNGRiskit + β9IRLibor + εit     (1) 
4.3. Limitations 
Since Statement 133 became effective for financial 
statements registered with the SEC for fiscal years beginning 
after September 2008, only 1 year of data were available for 
BHCs derivatives and hedging activities after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS 133. For this reason, the scope of this 
study was limited to the year Statement 133 was amended 
(2008) and 1 year after the standards’ amendment (2009). 
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This limitation might compromise the ability of this study to 
produce accurate results about whether or not BHCs adjusted 
their corporate risk management strategies to be more 
accounting responsive, in the case that BHCs felt they did 
not have sufficient time to review, comprehend, and execute 
the amended requirements of Statement 133 while finalizing 
all necessary computer-based information system 
conversions. 
5. Results of Tests of Hypothesis 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The primary data examined in this study are for U.S. 
BHCs in Peer 1 and Peer 2 Groups with total assets greater 
than $10 and $3 billion respectively. The list of the BHCs 
Peer Groups as of the third quarter of 2009 was obtained 
from the National Information Center of the Federal Reserve 
Board home page found at 
http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/BHCPRRPT/BHC
PR_Peer.htm. The focus of this study is on the largest 
financial institutions because BHCs in Peer 1 and Peer 2 
Groups epitomize the derivative activities of the entire 
banking industry which helps avoid sample selection bias. 
According to the Comptroller of the Currency[32], in the 
United States the derivatives market is controlled by the five 
largest BHCs which represent 97% of the total financial 
industry’s notional amount of derivatives. Additionally, the 
OCC[32] trusts that these financial institutions have the 
sophisticated tools and expertise needed to operate in the 
“highly specialized business of structuring, trading, and 
managing derivatives transactions” [32, p.1]. 
The data for the derivative instruments and hedging 
activities of the sampled BHCs were collected from their 
annual financial statements (10Ks) found in the Edgar Filing 
System of the SEC by using the open full reader search and 
keyword searches such as notional, cash flow hedges, fair 
value hedges, economic hedges, derivatives, and SFAS 133 
from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2009. In the BHCs 
official website under investor relations, data for the CEOs 
stock option-based compensation were retrieved from the 
BHCs proxy statements, while data on the number of 
analysts following the company were retrieved under analyst 
coverage. 
Appendix B provides a listing of BHCs in Peer Groups 1 
and 2 based on their reporting of derivatives designated as 
hedging instruments in compliance with SFAS 133 as of 
December 31, 2009. Of the entire target population of 167 
BHCs, 62 BHCs used derivatives that qualified for hedge 
accounting, 76 BHCS used derivatives that did not qualify 
for hedge accounting, 23 BHCs did not use any derivatives, 5 
BHCs only used trading derivatives, and 3 BHCs used 
derivatives that complied with international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS). Specifically, 45 BHCs from Peer 
1 Group and 17 BHCs from Peer 2 Group used derivatives 
that qualified for hedge accounting. In Peer 1, 20 BHCs were 
classified as SFAS133-compliant hedgers and 25 BHCs 
were classified as SFAS133-accounting hedgers. In Peer 2, 
four BHCs were classified as SFAS133- compliant hedgers 
and 13 BHCs were classified as SFAS133-accounting 
hedgers. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the 2008 and 
2009 total notional value of hedging instruments designated 
as accounting, cash flow, fair value, and economic hedges 
for SFAS133-compliant and SFAS-accounting hedgers to 
investigate whether or not BHCs increased their level of 
accounting hedges and decreased their level of economic 
hedges in response to the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133. For 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers results suggest that the 2009 
notional value of cash flow hedges (M = 1.05, SD = 2.46), 
fair value hedges (M = 0.73, SD = 1.88), and accounting 
hedges (M = 2.96, SD = 3.34) were significantly higher than 
the 2008 notional value of cash flow hedges (M = 0.26, SD = 
2.68) , fair value hedges (M = 0.12, SD = 1.79), and 
accounting hedges (M = 2.20, SD = 4.40). For 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers results suggest that for 2009 the 
notional value of fair value hedges (M = 0.97, SD = 1.88) and 
accounting hedges (M = 1.89, SD = 4.26) were significantly 
higher than the 2008 notional value of fair value hedges (M = 
0.94, SD= 1.26) and accounting hedges (M = 1.03, SD = 
2.33), while for 2009 the notional value of cash flow hedges 
(M = 1.41, SD = 2.42) and economic hedges (M = 1.79, SD = 
3.45) were significantly lower than the 2008 notional value 
of cash flow hedges (M = 1.68, SD= 2.38) and economic 
hedges (M = 1.95, SD = 3.61). 
The results of descriptive statistics the Hypothesis  
showing that SFAS-accounting hedgers increased the level 
of accounting hedges and did not use any economic hedges, 
while SFAS133-compliant hedgers increased the level of 
accounting hedges and decreased the level of economic 
hedges. This is an indication that SFAS-accounting hedgers 
hedge in a limited fashion only where hedge accounting 
treatment is attained thus evading additional earnings 
volatility and decreasing just a limited amount of economic 
risks, while SFAS133-compliant hedgers hedge in a more 
optimal economic way thus recognizing the volatility in 
earnings originated from those hedges that do not qualify for 
hedge accounting.  
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Table 1.  Descriptive Stats: Notional Value of Hedging Instruments for SFAS133 Ahs & CHs 
SFAS 133 
ACCCOUNTING HEDGERS   
SFAS 133 
 COMPLIANT HEDGERS 
ACCOUNTING HEDGES* CASH FLOW HEDGES 
FAIR VALUE 
HEDGES 
ACCOUNTING 
HEDGES* 
CASH 
FLOW 
 
FAIR 
VALUE 
 
ECONOMIC 
HEDGES 
2009 NOTIONAL VALUE 
N 4 23 22 6  16 13 24 
M 2.960 1.054 0.733 1.898 1.413 0.971 1.790 
SD 3.344 2.462 1.880 4.264 2.423 1.887 3.450 
Min 4.057 0.037 0.019 0.002 0.000 0.005 0.001 
Max 7.873 95.00 79.807 10.60 6.672 5.926 1.484 
SEM 1.672 5.134 4.009 1.774 0.605 0.523 0.070 
Q1 1.262 0.195 0.269 0.080 0.015 0.013 0.012 
Mdn 1.781 0.550 0.501 0.216 0.187 0.017 0.050 
Q3 3.479 5.101 2.080 0.293 1.175 0.632 0.102 
2008 NOTIONAL VALUE 
N 4 27 21 6  15 12 24 
M 2.205 0.260 0.122 1.031 1.680 0.946 1.950 
SD 4.407 2.680 1.790 2.337 2.380 1.261 3.610 
Min 5.011 0.001 0.0025 0.023 0.001 0.244 0.001 
Max 8.817 0.850 0.550 5.800 0.669 4.743 1.530 
SEM 2203 0.051 0.039 0.954 0.061 0.364 0.073 
Q1 0.016 0.049 0.014 0.034 0.006 0.407 0.010 
Mdn 0.023 0.157 0.019 0.052 0.012 0.626 0.038 
Q3 2.206 0.344 0.275 0.186 0.273 0.929 0.151 
* Accounting Hedges include both the Notional Value of Cash Flow and Fair Value Hedges 
Table 2.  Two-Sample t-test: 2009 Difference in Notional between CHs & AHs 
2009 N M SD 
SFAS133 Accounting Hedgers (AH) 38 1.37 2.56 
SFAS133 Compliant Hedgers  (CH) 24 0.21 0.38 
    
difference (AH2009-CH2008)= 1.16    
standard error of difference =0.52    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= 2.20,  p= .0316, df=60    
 
5.2. Paired t Tests 
To investigate whether or not BHCs exhibited a more 
accounting responsive corporate risk management approach 
after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133, a paired sample t 
test was conducted to compare the total notional value of 
derivative instruments of SFAS133-compliant hedgers and 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers. Table 2 provides the t test 
results of the differences between the total notional value of 
cash flow hedges, fair value hedges, and economic hedges of 
the two groups of BHCs in 2009, one year after the 
amendment of SFAS 133. The t test revealed that there was a 
statistically significant difference between the mean notional 
values of derivative instruments of the two BHC groups, 
t (60) = -2.20, p≤.05 (two-tailed test). The mean notional 
value of derivative instruments of “SFAS133- Accounting 
Hedgers” (M=1.37, SD=2.56) was higher than the mean 
notional value of derivatives of “SFAS133-Compliant 
Hedgers” (M=0.21, SD=0.38). 
Table 3 provides the t test results of the differences 
between the total notional value of cash flow hedges, fair 
value hedges, and economic hedges of the two groups of 
BHCs in 2008, the year SFAS 133 was amended. The t test 
revealed that there was not a statistically significant 
difference between the mean notional values of derivative 
instruments of SFAS133 accounting hedgers (M=2.57, 
SD=14.26) and SFAS133 compliant hedgers (M=0.56, 
SD=1.48), conditions; t(60) = -2.20, p ≥.05 (two-tailed test), 
in 2008 the year SFAS 133 was amended. 
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Table 3.  Two-Sample t-test: 2008 Difference in Notional between CHs & AHs 
2008 N M SD 
SFAS133 Accounting Hedgers (AH) 38 2.57 4.26 
SFAS133 Compliant Hedgers  (CH) 24 0.56 1.48 
    
difference (AH2009-CH2008)= 2.01    
standard error of difference =2.93    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= 0.69,  p= .4953, df=60    
Table 4.  Two-Sample t-test: 2009/2008 Difference in Notional of Economic Hedges of CHs 
2008 N M SD 
SFAS133 Compliant Hedgers (CH) 2009 24 0.17 0.34 
SFAS133 Compliant Hedgers (CH) 2008 24 0.19 0.36 
    
difference (CH2009-CH2008)= -0.016    
standard error of difference =0.10    
t test of difference = H0: µ1 - µ2 =0: t= -0.16,  p= .4379,   df=60 
 
Table 4 provides the t test results of the difference 
between the 2009/2008 notional values of economic hedges 
of SFAS 133 compliant hedgers. The t test revealed that 
there was not a statistically significant difference between 
the 2009 mean notional values of economic hedges (M=0.17, 
SD=0.34) and the 2008 mean notional values of economic 
hedges (M=0.19, SD=0.36) of SFAS133 compliant hedgers, 
conditions; t (60) = - 0.16, p ≥.05 (one-tailed, lower). 
The results suggest that SFAS133- accounting hedgers 
exhibited a more accounting responsive corporate risk 
management approach in 2009 after the 2008 amendment of 
SFAS 133. SFAS133- accounting hedgers, along with the 
reevaluation of their risk management approach captured the 
benefits of hedge accounting and effectively addressed the 
implementation of SFAS 133 since it requires early 
methodical planning to determine the evaluation of hedge 
effectiveness according to Coughlin[10] in an attempt to 
manage any associated earnings volatility. SFAS133- 
compliant hedgers, on the other side, did not exhibit an 
accounting responsive corporate risk management approach 
in 2009 after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 133, and 
continued hedging in an optimal economic way (thus 
recognizing the volatility in earnings originated from those 
hedges that did not qualify for hedge accounting but 
decreasing economic risks). 
5.3. Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression model #1 were used to test if the 
corporate risk management variables significantly predicted 
a corporate risk management approach that is more 
accounting responsive for SFAS133-accounting hedgers, 
while it is more optimal in an economic way for 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers one year after the 2008 
amendment of  SFAS133. Table 5 presents the multiple 
regression results of the Hypothesis. To test the effects of 
SFAS 133 on BHCs corporate risk management approach 
the total notional value of all derivative instruments 
designated as cash flow hedges, fair value hedges and 
economic hedges (NOTIONAL) for both groups of BHCs, 
were regressed against the following predictor variables: 
EVol, ESmooth, ESmooth1, FINLEV, INFOASY, 
UNDERC, MNGRisk, CapAdeq1, IRLIBOR, HEDGEIN 
cash flow,and HEDGEIN fair value and, NETGains/Losses 
(only for SFAS 133-compliant hedgers). The results of the 
regression indicated that the combination of the variables 
explained 68.9% of the variance in NOTIONAL for 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers (R2=.689, F (11, 26) =5.24, 
p<.005), while they explained 86.1% of the variance in 
NOTIONAL for SFAS133-compliant hedgers (R2 =.861, F 
(13, 10) =4.78, p<.005). 
SFAS133-Accounting Hedgers. Multiple regression 
analysis were used to test if the corporate-risk management 
hedging variables significantly predicted a more accounting 
responsive corporate risk management approach for 
SFAS133-accounting hedgers one year after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS133.The variables produced a 
coefficient of determination R2 of .998 (F (11, 26) = 9.90,p = 
3.57) for the prediction of SFAS133-accounting hedgers’ 
corporate risk management approach (NOTIONAL). The 
predictor with the lowest non-significant regression 
coefficient (EVol, β= 4.8, t (df =26) = 40.4, p = 5.33) were 
removed. The final regression analysis conducted had a 
coefficient of determination R2 of .689 (F (11, 26) = 5.24, p 
=.0003) with INFOASY (p = .0359, β = 1.2485, t = 2.213) as 
the strongest predictor. INFOASY explained 68.9% of the 
variation and were positively related to SFAS133- 
accounting hedgers’ corporate risk management approach 
(NOTIONAL). Finally, tests for multicollinearity indicated 
that a very low level of multicollinearity was present for 
INFOASY (VIF = 0.1249). 
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Table 5.  Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Notional 
NOTIONAL SFAS-133 ACCOUNTING HEDGERS 
SFAS-133 
COMPLIANT HEDGERS 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Variables 
EVol    0.1781 0.2848 0.3376 
ESmooth -0.016 0.6756 -0.0084 -0.060 0.1015 -0.6172 
ESmooth1 0.8666 0.1562 0.1113 -0.061 0.4681 0.2858 
FINLEV -0.006 0.2911 -1.0571 0.1185 0.2330 0.3072 
INFOASY 0.332 0.5642 0.1249 0.1318 0.1070 -0.0002 
UNDERC -0.024 0.4177 -0.0083 -0.1463 0.7287 -1.4274 
MNGRisk -0.004 0.2322 -0.0056 -0.0020 0.1611 6.1410 
CapAdeq1 -0.048 0.1647 -0.0056 0.0381 0.3089 -0.3786 
IRLIBOR 0.164 0.1667 0.0198 -0.1225 0.1554 0.0670 
HEDGEIN cash flow -0.057 0.3911 -1.8257 0.0431 0.3018 -0.0072 
HEDGEIN fair value -0.245 0.4731 -0.7712 -0.0237 0.1284 -0.0063 
NETGains(Losses)    -0.0490 0.3901 -0.0388 
OCI -0.090 0.084 -0.6488 -0.0993 0.1212 -0.1378 
 
SFAS133-Compliant Hedgers. Multiple regression 
analysis were used to test if the corporate-risk management 
hedging variables significantly predicted a less accounting 
responsive corporate risk management approach for 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers one year after the 2008 
amendment of  SFAS133. The variables produced a 
coefficient of determination R2 of .861 (F (13, 10) = 4.78,p 
= .009) for the prediction of SFAS-compliant hedgers’ 
corporate risk management approach (NOTIONAL), with 
three significant predictors of NOTIONAL -- MNGRisk, 
HEDGEIN cash flow, and HEDGEIN fair value. The 
predictors explained 86.1% of the variation in NOTIONAL 
for SFAS133-compliant hedgers. The strongest predictor 
was HEDGEIN fair value (p = .0006), followed by 
MNGRisk (p = .0034), and HEDGEIN cash flow (p = .0388). 
MNGRisk (β = 0.614, t = 3.811) was positively related to 
NOTIONAL, while HEDGEIN cash flow (β = -0.0072, t = 
-2.377) and HEDGEIN fair value (β = -0.0063, t = -4.905) 
were both negatively related to NOTIONAL. Finally, tests 
for multicollinearity indicated that a low level of 
multicollinearity were present for MNGRisk (VIF=2.050), 
HEDGEIN cash flow (VIF = 3.036), and HEDGEIN fair 
value (VIF=2.097). 
The multiple regression analysis results suggest that the 
increased level of attention corporate risk management 
received under SFAS 133 and the different recognition and 
measurement method of accounting hedges and economic 
hedges complicated BHCs hedging decisions and 
subsequently their risk management course of action. 
SFAS-accounting hedgers’ concern of how investors will 
react to the possibility of increased volatility evolving from 
economic hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting 
under SFAS 133 has driven them to adjust their corporate 
risk management strategy to one that is more accounting 
responsive to avoid analysts’ negative stock valuations. 
SFAS-accounting hedgers’ acuity that earnings volatility 
will be negatively deciphered by investors instigated them to 
give up the benefits of economic hedges in order to avoid 
earnings volatility at all costs. SFAS133- accounting hedgers 
in an attempt to manage any associated earnings volatility 
re-evaluated their risk management approach and captured 
the benefits of hedge accounting by successfully addressing 
the implementation of SFAS 133 since it requires early 
methodical planning to determine the evaluation of hedge 
effectiveness [10].  SFAS133-compliant hedgers, on the 
other side, acknowledge that it is unfeasible to engage in a 
hedging policy that is economically advantageous without 
meeting half way with the accounting impact. Compliant 
hedgers instigate a new exemplar for corporate risk 
management with the intent to find a better equilibrium 
between the economic risks and accounting volatility. 
6. Interpretation of Findings 
The descriptive results in Table 1 provide the 2008 and 
2009 total notional value of derivative instruments 
designated as accounting, cash flow, fair value, and 
economic hedges for both groups of BHCs showing that 
SFAS-accounting hedgers increased the level of accounting 
hedges and did not use any economic hedges, while 
SFAS133- compliant hedgers increased the level of 
accounting hedges and decreased the level of economic 
hedges. For SFAS133-accounting hedgers the results suggest 
that the 2009 notional value of cash flow hedges, fair value 
hedges and accounting hedges is significantly higher than the 
2008 notional value. For SFAS133-compliant hedgers the 
results suggest that the 2009 notional value of fair value 
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hedges and accounting hedges is significantly higher than the 
2008 notional value, while the 2009 notional value of cash 
flow hedges and economic hedges is significantly lower than 
the 2008 notional value. The descriptive results in Table 1 
show that SFAS-accounting hedgers hedge in a limited 
fashion only where hedge accounting treatment is attained 
thus evading additional earnings volatility and decreasing 
just a limited amount of economic risks, while 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers hedge in a more optimal 
economic way thus recognizing the volatility in earnings 
originated from those hedges that do not comply for hedge 
accounting. 
There is a belief in the existing accounting literature that 
some BHCs might have been prompted to adjust their 
corporate risk management strategy to one that is more 
accounting responsive since SFAS 133 has compromised 
BHCs competence to economically hedge financial and 
economic risks. Supported by the theoretical findings  of 
Kolsasovsky[27], Lins et al.[28], Revsine, Collins, and 
Johnson[37], Peterson et al.[34], and DeMarzo et al.[12], 
there are concerns that the fear of increased earnings 
volatility derived from economic hedges that do not oblige 
for hedge accounting forced BHCs to decide between 
reducing earnings volatility in accounting terms exploiting 
less- competent economic risk management strategies or 
manage economic risks with economic hedges disregarding 
accounting earnings volatility. 
Singh[39], Park[33], Zhang[44], and Zhou[46] found that 
after the implementation of SFAS 133, derivatives users had 
lower levels of earnings volatility and higher levels of 
income smoothing proposing that SFAS 133 may have 
driven companies’ earnings management decisions. Lins et 
al.[28] claimed that “companies that operate in an 
environment where contracts are more likely to be written on 
accounting data” (p. 34), and award earnings volatility 
reduction as a risk management lead tactic will be more 
apprehensive to use derivatives that qualify for hedge 
accounting. The authors documented a considerable decline 
in the use of foreign- exchange and no- linear derivative 
instruments after the implementation of SFAS 133 for the 
reason that it  is unlikely they will qualify for hedge 
accounting. 
Green (2008) avowed that SFAS 133 by not allowing 
special hedge accounting for all relationships that may be 
economic hedges disinclines BHCs to use economic hedges 
if they feel their accounting income is going to be affected 
adversely, not by economic events, but by the accounting 
convention applied to a hedge. Eckstein, Markelevich, and 
Reinstein[13] substantiated the correspondence of fair-value 
hedges with deferred debits/assets and cash-flow hedges 
with deferred credits/revenue imposing that the new 
guidance in SFAS 133 could encourage BHCs to manipulate 
earnings management and objectively defer the recognition 
of their hedging activities in the financial statements. 
The results of paired t tests in Table 2 support Hypothesis 
I illustrating that there  is a statistically significant 
difference in the mean notional value of derivative hedging 
instruments for SFAS-accounting hedgers and 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers in 2009 one year after the 2008 
amendment of SFAS 133. The results of paired t tests in 
Table 3 show that there is not a statistically significant 
difference in the mean notional value of derivative 
instruments for SFAS133 accounting hedgers and SFAS133 
compliant hedgers in 2008 the year SFAS 133 was amended. 
The t test results in Table 4 reveal that for 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers there is not a statistically 
significant difference between the 2009 means notional 
values of economic hedges and the 2008 mean notional 
values of economic. 
The mean notional value of derivatives designated as 
hedging instruments for 2009 is 1.37 for SFAS133- 
accounting hedgers and 0.21 for SFAS133- compliant 
hedgers. The mean notional value of derivatives designated 
as hedging instruments for 2008 is 0.25 for SFAS133- 
accounting hedgers and 0.56 for SFAS133- compliant 
hedgers. In 2009 the mean notional value of hedges for 
SFAS133- accounting hedgers exceeds that of SFAS133- 
compliant hedgers by 65%, while the mean notional value of 
hedges for SFAS133- accounting hedgers is 55% higher in 
2009. From the entire population of Peer Group 1 and Peer 
Group 2, SFAS133-accounting hedgers represent 61% of the 
BHCs that use only derivatives instruments designated as 
accounting hedges and SFAS133-compliant hedgers 
represent 38% of the BHCs that use derivatives instruments 
designated as economic hedges. 
The results suggest that SFAS133- accounting hedgers 
exhibited a more accounting responsive corporate risk 
management approach than the SFAS133- compliant 
hedgers in 2009 one year after the 2008 amendment of SFAS 
133. This study evokes that hedge accounting under SFAS 
133 do actually affect the hedging behavior of SFAS133- 
accounting hedgers and SFAS133- compliant hedgers in 
different ways. SFAS133- accounting hedgers in an attempt 
to manage any associated earnings volatility re- evaluated 
their risk management approach and captured the benefits of 
hedge accounting by successfully addressing the 
implementation of SFAS 133 since it requires early 
methodical planning to determine the evaluation of hedge 
effectiveness (Coughlin, 2003). 
The hedge accounting rules of SFAS 133 advocate an 
opportunistic earnings management behavior. BHCs along 
with the reassessment of their corporate risk management 
strategy have to deal with the implementation of SFAS 133 
since the standard “places the burden on management to 
design appropriate effectiveness tests, and measure the 
change in fair value or cash flows attributable to the risk 
being hedged” [14, p.129]. The results are consistent with the 
empirical accounting studies of Singh[39]; Park[33]; 
Zhang[44];and Zhou[46] who found that derivatives users 
after the implementation of SFAS 133 had lower levels of 
earnings volatility and higher levels of income smoothing 
proposing that SFAS 133 determine the earnings 
management decisions of companies.  
Furthermore, the results of this study are in accordance to 
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the results of Hughen[23] and Glaum and Klocker[18]. 
Hughen[23] found that “firms’ ability to meet earnings is 
positively associated with managers focusing more on 
accounting earnings than on economic earnings” (p. 1052) 
concluding that managers will maintain an economic hedge 
if they consider that the economic risk exposure is 
imperative compared to the volatility in earnings. Glaum et 
al.[18] presumed that firms with higher leverage and 
revenue- orientated hedging policies are more inclined to 
revise their corporate risk management practice to safeguard 
the implementation of hedge accounting accepting an 
elevated economic risk exposure than larger firms with 
regularly derivative usage and higher growth opportunities. 
The multiple regression analysis shows that the most 
significant determinant of hedging for SFAS-accounting 
hedgers is information asymmetry which is computed as the 
logarithm of the number of financial analysts assessing the 
performance of a BHC annually and for SFAS133-compliant 
hedgers is hedge ineffectiveness which measures BHCs 
ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) recognized in 
income on derivatives designated as cash flow or fair value 
hedges. The results suggest that the increased level of 
attention corporate risk management received under SFAS 
133 and the different recognition and measurement method 
of accounting hedges and economic hedges convoluted 
BHCs hedging decisions and subsequently their risk 
management course of action. SFAS-accounting hedgers’ 
concern of how investors will react to the possibility of 
increased volatility evolving from economic hedges that do 
not comply for hedge accounting under SFAS 133 has driven 
them to adjust their corporate risk management strategy to 
one that is more accounting responsive to avoid analysts’ 
negative stock valuations. SFAS-accounting hedgers’ acuity 
that earnings volatility will be negatively deciphered by 
investors instigated them to give up the benefits of economic 
hedges in order to avoid earnings volatility at all costs. 
SFAS133-compliant hedgers, on the other side, 
acknowledge that it is unfeasible to engage in a hedging 
policy that is economically advantageous without meeting 
half way with the accounting impact. Compliant hedgers 
instigate a new exemplar for corporate risk management with 
the intent to find a better equilibrium between the economic 
risks and accounting volatility. 
7. Conclusions 
This study examined the derivatives and hedging activities 
under SFAS 133 of the entire population of the Peer 1 and 
Peer 2 BHCs of the Federal Reserve System. From the entire 
target population of 167 BHCs only 62 banks use derivatives 
that qualify for hedge accounting from which 38 BHCs are 
classified as SFAS133-accounting hedgers and 24 BHCs are 
classified as SFAS133-compliant hedgers. The limited 
number of derivative users confirms that hedge accounting is 
very expensive for small banks to implement and maintain 
since they do not have the enormous resources needed to 
dedicate to training their personnel in derivatives, hedge 
accounting, and hedge effectiveness testing according to 
Pollock[35]. Whalen[11] argued that “the Fed’s effort to 
make the world safe for derivatives, fails from the 
incompetence of small banks to understand and execute 
derivatives triggering major difficulties in the U.S. financial 
system” as cited in Christen[11, p.11]. 
Norris[31] argued that although hedge accounting under 
SFAS 133 made it possible for companies to smooth their 
financial statements by preventing earnings from “the 
gyrations in value” of certain derivative hedging instruments.  
Hedge effectiveness has asserted many challenges for many 
corporations according to Hughen[23] and hedge accounting 
has been criticized for its complexity derived from the fact 
that not all hedges qualify for hedge accounting. According 
to the extant accounting literature, economic hedges that do 
not  comply for hedge-accounting, while reducing market 
risk exposure and earnings  volatility in economic terms, 
increase earnings volatility in accounting terms since SFAS 
133 obliges all fair-value variations of derivative instruments 
with no-accounting hedging designation to be recognized in 
income. Consequently, executives are obligated to use only 
accounting hedges concentrating on accounting earnings 
regardless of the economic risk exposure or use economic 
hedges concentrating on economic earnings regardless of the 
associated earnings volatility based on Hughen[23]; 
Kolbasovsky[27]; Revsine et al.[37]. 
SFAS-accounting hedgers’ concern of how investors will 
react to the possibility of increased volatility evolving from 
economic hedges that do not comply for hedge accounting 
under SFAS 133 has driven them to adjust their corporate 
risk management strategy to one that is more accounting 
responsive to avoid analysts’ negative stock valuations. 
SFAS-accounting hedgers’ acuity that earnings volatility 
will be negatively deciphered by investors instigated them to 
give up the benefits of economic hedges in order to avoid 
earnings volatility at all costs. SFAS133-compliant hedgers, 
on the other side, acknowledge that it is unfeasible to engage 
in a hedging policy that is economically advantageous 
without meeting half way with the accounting impact. 
Compliant hedgers instigate a new exemplar for corporate 
risk management with the intent to find a better equilibrium 
between the economic risks and accounting volatility. 
This study extended prior research on corporate risk 
management activities of BHCs and may effect social 
change by presenting new evidence on the effects of SFAS 
133 economic hedges on earnings volatility. This research 
may influence society positively by finding new evidence of 
the degree and causes of BHCs’ earnings volatility and 
providing the empirical support for the FASB and the SEC to 
improve the qualitative disclosures of SFAS 133 and 
increase the transparency and visibility of accounting hedges 
and economic hedges in the financial statements.
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Appendix A 
Variable Definition and Measurement 
Variable Construct Definition 
NOTIONAL Notional Value Aggregate total notional value of derivative contracts 
EVol Earnings Volatility The average standard deviation of the ratio of total earnings before income taxes and loan loss provisions to average total assets 
ESmooth Earnings Smoothing The ratio of loan loss provisions to net interest income 
ESmooth1 Earnings Smoothing The ratio of the total notional value of derivatives used as hedging instruments divided by total assets 
FINLEV Financial Distress Tier 1 Leverage ratio defined as Tier 1 Capital divided by adjusted quarterly average total assets after certain adjustments 
INFOASY Information Asymmetry The logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm each year 
UNDERC Underinvestment Cost Market-to-book ratio computed as market value per share of common stock to book value per share 
MNGRisk Managerial Risk Aversion Ratio of CEOs stock option-based compensation relative to total compensation 
CapAdeq1 BHCs Capital Adequacy Tier 1 Capital which is Total Equity Capital minus (plus) accumulated net gains (losses) on cash flow hedges. 
IRLIBOR Interest Rate Coefficient 
The absolute value of the estimated coefficient from a regression of each 
BHCs monthly stock returns on the monthly percentage change in 
LIBOR 
HEDGEINF Hedge Ineffectiveness 
Measures BHCs ineffective portion of the amount of gain (loss) 
recognized in income on derivatives designated as cash flow or fair 
value hedges 
NETGain 
(Loss) Economic Hedges 
Measures both realized and unrealized gains and losses recognized in 
income due to changes in fair value of derivatives designated as 
economic hedges 
OCI Net Gains(Losses) reclassified from OCI to Income OCI measures the net realized gains/losses reclassified from AOCI into income on derivatives designated as cash flow hedges 
Appendix B 
SFAS 133 Classification of BHCs 
INSTITUTION NAME 
SFAS 133 
COMPLIANT 
HEDGERS 
INSTITUTION NAME 
SFAS 133 
ACCOUNTING 
HEDGERS 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP SFAS133 CH JPMORGAN CHASE & CO SFAS133 AH 
CITIGROUP INC SFAS133 CH MORGAN STANLEY SFAS133 AH 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY SFAS133 CH HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDING INC SFAS133 AH 
METLIFE, INC SFAS133 CH BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP SFAS133 AH 
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, 
INC SFAS133 CH STATE STREET CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
US BANCORP SFAS133 CH TD BANK US HOLDING COMPANY SFAS133 AH 
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC SFAS133 CH KEYCORP SFAS133 AH 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP SFAS133 CH NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
BB&T CORPORATION SFAS133 CH M&T BANK CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP SFAS133 CH MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY SFAS133 CH ZIONS BANCORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP SFAS133 CH HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
CIT GROUP INC SFAS133 CH SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP. SFAS133 AH 
COMERICA INCORPORATED SFAS133 CH FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES SFAS133 CH CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
BANCO POPULAR,INC SFAS133 CH COMMERCE BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP. SFAS133 CH WEBSTER FINANCIAL CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
BOK FINANCIAL CORPORATION SFAS133 CH CULLEN/FROST BANKERS, INC SFAS133 AH 
 Universal Journal of Accounting and Finance 3(2): 30-44, 2015 43 
 
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP SFAS133 CH VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP SFAS133 AH 
FIRST NIAGARA GROUP, INC SFAS133 CH MB FINANCIAL, INC SFAS133 AH 
WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP. SFAS133 CH SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP SFAS133 CH SVB FINANCIAL GROUP SFAS133 AH 
SUN BANCORP, INC SFAS133 CH CITIZENS REPUBLIC BANCORP, INC SFAS133 AH 
UNITED BANKSHARES, INC SFAS133 CH FIRST MERIT CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
  FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP SFAS133 AH 
  FIRST MERCHANTS CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
  FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP, INC SFAS133 AH 
  IBERIA BANK CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
  INDEPENDENT BANK CORP SFAS133 AH 
  NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
  PLAINSCAPITAL CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
  SCOTIABANK SFAS133 AH 
  RENASANT SFAS133 AH 
  SIMMONS FIRST NATIONAL CORP SFAS133 AH 
  STERLING BANCSHARES, INC SFAS133 AH 
  TAYLOR CAPITAL GROUP, INC SFAS133 AH 
  TRUSTMARK CORPORATION SFAS133 AH 
  UNITED COMMUNITY BANK, INC SFAS133 AH 
* SFAS 133- COMPLIANT HEDGER (SFAS133 CH)               SFAS 133- ACCOUNTING HEDGER (SFAS133 AH) 
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